The winner's curse in banking by Sherril Shaffer




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
Research Department
WORKING PAPER NO. 97-25
THE WINNER’S CURSE IN BANKING
Sherrill Shaffer
November 1997WORKING PAPER NO. 97-25
THE WINNER’S CURSE IN BANKING
Sherrill Shaffer
November 1997
Much of this paper was completed while the author was affiliated with the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. The author is
grateful for research assistance from Louise Berna.ABSTRACT
Theoretical studies have noted that loan applicants rejected by one bank can apply at another
bank, systematically worsening the pool of applicants faced by all banks.  This paper presents the
first empirical evidence of this effect and explores some additional ramifications, including the role
of common filters, such as commercially available credit scoring models, in mitigating this adverse
selection, implications for de novo banks, implications for banks’ incentives to comply with fair
lending laws, and macroeconomic effects.
JEL codes: G2, L1
Sherrill Shaffer
Department of Economics and Finance
University of Wyoming




e-mail: shaffer@uwyo.eduTHE WINNER’S CURSE IN BANKING
1. Introduction
Theoretical studies by Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993) have identified a winner’s curse
in bank lending, resulting from the ability of rejected loan applicants to apply at additional banks.
To the extent that credit screening is imperfectly correlated across banks, poorer credit risks thereby
gain a greater chance of being misidentified as good risks, as an increasing function of the number
of banks in the market.  
No study thus far has explored empirical evidence for this effect.  Moreover, at least three
theoretical aspects of this effect have also been previously overlooked.  First, to the extent that banks
rely on common filters (shared databases and uniform screening criteria) in assessing applications,
the adverse selection can be theoretically mitigated.  An immediate corollary is that the use of credit
bureau databases and commercially standardized credit scoring models would have the potential to
provide this sort of improvement, even if the credit scoring models are somewhat less accurate than
bank-specific traditional credit analysis.  A further corollary is that banks may be more likely to
adopt such standardized scoring models in unconcentrated geographic or product markets and during
recessions.
Second, de novo banks (recent entrants) should be particularly susceptible to adverse
selection, as any new bank in a community will face a pool of potential applicants that includes a
backlog of those previously rejected over some period of time, in addition to the normal flow of
recent rejects encountered by mature banks in a market.  This effect is generally recognized by
practitioners, but has never been formally quantified.  Because roughly 3,000 new banks have2
formed within the past 15 years in the U.S. despite substantial net structural consolidation, the
aggregate impact of this problem is potentially large.
Third, although previous studies have focused on the case in which some correlates of loan
performance are unobservable to the bank, rendering the credit screening process noisy, the same
model would also characterize outcomes when banks are prohibited by law from conditioning their
decisions on one or more observable correlates of loan performance.  Under certain assumptions that
have been empirically supported, this could mean that banks have a profit incentive to resist
particular forms of consumer legislation in concentrated markets more than in unconcentrated
markets.
Besides elaborating on this richer theoretical context of adverse selection, the present study
develops two forms of empirical evidence of the winner’s curse in banking and explores some
indications of its broader macroeconomic effects.  
2.  Theoretical Considerations
Consider a market with N potential borrowers per period and n banks.  Borrowers are of two
types as in Broecker (1990), Ferguson and Peters (1995), and Shaffer (1996).  "Good" borrowers
repay a fraction   of their loans on average while "bad" borrowers repay a fraction   of their loans H L
on average, where 1 >   ("high") >   ("low") > 0.  A fraction   of these N potential borrowers are HL
good while the remainder (1 -  ) are bad.  Banks lend at an interest rate r that is fixed, as in Ferguson
and Peters (1995) and Shaffer (1996); and exogenous, as in Nakamura (1993).  A bank earns an
expected profit of r  - 1 +   on each $1 loan made to a good borrower and r  - 1 +   on each $1 HH LL
loan made to a bad borrower.   To ensure a sustainable equilibrium, we assume r  - 1 +   > 0.  To
1
HH3
rule out the trivial equilibrium in which no bank would bother to screen applicants, we assume r  - L
1 +   < 0. L
When a potential borrower applies at a bank, that bank observes a signal of the borrower’s
type and extends the loan if and only if the signal indicates that the borrower’s type is "good" (H).
Signals observed by multiple banks for a given borrower are assumed to be i.i.d., where each bank
infers the correct type with probability p  for good borrowers and p  for bad borrowers, and hH RL
incorrectly infers the type with probability 1 - p  for good borrowers and 1 - p  for bad borrowers. hH RL
Because a perfectly random or uninformative signal would have p  = p  = ½, we assume ½ < p hH RLh H
< 1 and ½ < p  < 1 so that signals are noisy but somewhat informative.  Each signal can be RL
interpreted as the outcome of the bank's credit screening process, whether a traditional loan analysis
or an automated credit scoring model.
If there is only one bank in the market, all potential borrowers apply at that bank.  The bank
deems p N + (1 - p )(1 -  )N applicants to be creditworthy and makes this many loans for an hH RL
expected profit of p N(r  - 1 +  ) + (1 - p )(1 -  )N(r  - 1 +  ).  The expected loan loss rate hH H H RLL L
for this bank is [p (1 -  ) + (1 - p )(1 -  )(1 -  )] / [p  + (1 - p )(1 - )].  Rejected applicants hH H RLL h H R L
cannot subsequently reapply.
If two banks occupy the market, we assume that half of the potential borrowers initially apply
to one bank, and the other half to the other bank.  This symmetric case corresponds to Nakamura's
"anonymous lender" scenario.  Any applicant rejected by one bank can subsequently apply at the
other bank.  Thus, each bank makes half as many loans to initial applicants as would the monopoly
bank and earns half the expected profit from this subset of borrowers, but additionally faces (1 -
p)N/2 + p (1 -  )N/2 applicants who were previously rejected by the other bank.  A crucial point hH RL4
is that the banks cannot distinguish between initial applicants (those who have not been previously
rejected by another bank) and subsequent applicants (those who have been previously rejected by
another bank).  Therefore, in addition to its loans made to a subset of initial applicants, each bank
makes p (1 - p ) N/2 + (1 - p )p (1 -  )N/2 loans to second-round applicants previously rejected hH hH RL RL
by the other bank.  The total number of loans made by both banks equals p N(2 - p ) + (1 - p )(1 hH hH RL
+ p )(1 -  )N, which exceeds that made by the monopoly bank since 2 - p  > 1 and 1 + p  > 1. RL hH RL
Expected profits for each bank are p N(2 - p )(r  - 1 +  )/2 + (1 - p )(1 + p )(1 -  )N(r  - 1 hH hH H H RL RLL
+  )/2, and the expected loan loss rate for each bank (and for the banking industry in this market) L
is [p (2 - p )(1 -  ) + (1 - p )(1 + p )(1 -  )(1 -  )] / [p (2 - p ) + (1 - p )(1 + p )(1 -  )]. hH hH H RL RL L hH hH RL RL
In general, where a market contains n identical banks and potential borrowers apply at
randomly selected banks until they either receive a loan or have been rejected by all n banks, each
bank receives a total number of applicants per period given by:
(1) Applicants per bank  =  ( N/n)'  (1 - p )  + (1 -  )(N/n)'  p 
n m-1 n m-1
m=1 hH m=1 RL
and makes loans to those its signals indicate to be creditworthy:
(2) Loans per bank  =   (p N/n)'  (1 - p )  + (1 - p )(1 -  )(N/n)'  p. hH m=1 hH RLm = 1 R L
n m-1 n m-1
The aggregate number of loans made to the fixed pool of N potential borrowers is:
(3) Total loans  =  p N'  (1 - p )  + (1 - p )(1 -  )N'  p hH m=1 hH RLm = 1 R L
n m-1 n m-15
which is an increasing function of n since (1 - p )  > 0 and p  > 0 for all m $ 1.  That is, the hH RL
m-1 m-1
more banks inhabit the market, the fewer potential borrowers are ultimately unable to obtain a loan.
Because p  > ½ > 1 - p , a higher proportion of good applicants are accepted than the proportion hH RL
of accepted bad applicants in each round, with the result that each successive pool of rejected
applicants contains a higher proportion of bad risks than the previous round.  This worsening of the
pool, previously noted by Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993) and analyzed in more detail below,
generates an expected loan loss rate that is an increasing function of the number of banks:
(4) Expected loss rate = 
[p (1 -  )'  (1 - p )  + (1 - p )(1 -  )(1 -  )'  p]   /   hH H m=1 hH RLL m = 1 R L
n m-1 n m-1
[p '  (1 - p )  + (1 - p )(1 -  )'  p] hH m=1 hH RLm = 1 R L
n m-1 n m-1
   = { (1 -  )[1 - (1 - p ) ] + (1 -  )(1 -  )(1 - p )} / { [1 - (1 - p ) ] + (1 -  )(1 - p )}. Hh H L R Lh HR L
nn n n
The change in the expected loss rate, comparing a market with n banks to one with n - 1 banks,
reduces after some algebra to:
(5) Change in expected loss rate, n banks versus (n - 1) banks  =
p( 1  -  p) (1 -  )(  -  )[p  '  (1 - p )  - (1 - p ) '  p] hH RLH L R L m=1 hH hH m=1 RL
n-1 n-1 m-1 n-1 n-1 m-16
which has the sign of the expression in square brackets.  Comparing this latter expression term by
term, and recalling that p  > ½ > (1 - p ), we note that p (1 - p )  - (1 - p ) p  = p (1 - p ) [p RLh H R Lh H h H R L R Lh H R L
ab a b bb a -
 - (1 - p ) ] > 0 for all a - b > 0.  Substituting n - 1 for a, and each successive value in the
ba - b
hH
summations of m - 1 for b, we obtain the key result that an increase in the number of banks
monotonically increases the expected loan loss rate.  
Expected profits for each bank i are:
(6) E   =  p (N/n)(r  - 1 +  )'  (1 - p )   ih H H H m = 1 h H
nm - 1
+ (1 - p )(1 -  )(N/n)(r  - 1 +  )'  p RLL L m = 1 R L
nm - 1
=   (N/n)(r  - 1 +  )[1 - (1 - p ) ] + (1 -  )(N/n)(r  - 1 +  )(1 - p ). HH h H LL R Ln
n
Since 1 - (1 - p )  > 1 - (1 - p )  for all n > 1, the contribution of good borrowers to expected hH hH
nn - 1
profits is an increasing function of n.  At the same time, since 1 - p  > 1 - p  for all n > 1 and (r RL RLL
nn - 1
- 1 +  ) < 0 by assumption, the drain on profits by bad borrowers is also greater for larger n.  We L
can assess how these contrary effects net out across the entire banking market by calculating the
change in aggregate expected profits, comparing a market with n banks to one with n - 1 banks:
(7) E(' )  =  p (1 - p ) N(r  - 1 +  ) + p (1 - p )(1 -  )N(r  - 1 +  ). ih H h H H H R L R LL L
n-1 n-1
In attempting to sign this expression, note that 1 > p  > ½ and 1 > p  > ½ implies that p (1 - p ) hH RLh H h H
n-1
< p (1 - p ) for sufficiently large n.  Also, (r  - 1 +  ) > 0 while (r  - 1 +  ) < 0 by assumption. RL RLH H L L
n-17
Even so, the sign of equation (7) depends on the parameter values.  Thus, while the loan loss rate
increases with the number of banks, it is possible for expected aggregate bank profits to increase
with n if there are enough type H borrowers and if each type H loan is sufficiently profitable.   
2
Applicant Attrition
A further detail of adverse selection among bank borrowers concerns "applicant attrition."
A rational potential borrower will apply for a loan as long as the expected benefit of applying equals
or exceeds the cost of applying.  The expected benefit equals the probability of receiving the loan
times the benefit of the loan.  The cost of applying includes both direct costs such as application fees
and other transaction costs, and indirect costs or opportunity costs resulting from the time needed
to obtain and file each application.  The benefits of some loans may be time-dependent and decline
with any delays in granting the loan, as with seasonal agricultural loans, construction loans at
different phases of the business cycle, or a home mortgage where the buyer may lose the house if
financing is not approved by some deadline.  Extensive delays in granting certain business loans may
impair the borrower’s financial condition and ability to repay, further undermining her ability to
qualify for a loan.  A succession of rejections may also lead an applicant to revise downward her
perceived likelihood of being granted a loan on subsequent applications.  For all these reasons, the
equilibrium number of applications per borrower for a given loan should be finite and an applicant
who has been rejected several times will eventually stop applying at additional banks.  
The maximum number of applications in equilibrium will vary across borrowers, but the
overall impact of such considerations implies that the linkage between bank structure and average
applicant quality will be nonlinear.  In particular, the magnitude of the marginal effect of the number8
of banks on average credit quality should be a decreasing function of the number of banks,
approaching zero in the limit for markets containing more banks than the maximum equilibrium
number of applications for a given potential borrower.  This nonlinearity should be exacerbated by
the finiteness of available financial information about a given applicant, which implies that banks’
"draws" may not be completely independent of each other and, beyond some number of banks, may
constitute convex combinations of prior draws.  Thus, once an applicant has been rejected a certain
number of times, the likelihood of subsequent acceptance approaches zero.  Such nonlinearity is
tested in the empirical section below by substituting for the number of banks a concave function (the
logarithm) thereof.
Common Filters
The adverse selection characterized above relies on each bank’s observing separate,
imperfectly correlated signals about a given borrower’s type.  Clearly, if all banks observe the same
signals, an applicant rejected by one bank would be rejected by all and market structure would have
no impact on the loan loss rate or on the number of loans granted in aggregate.  Certain types of bank
loans appear to resemble this situation conceptually.  Credit analysis of consumer loans (including
credit cards) typically involves a background credit check of widely accessible databases maintained
by one of three large consumer credit bureaus (Equifax, Trans Union, or Experian/TRW).  Thus,
every potential lender has access to the same information about a given applicant, a factor that would
tend to increase the correlation of perceived creditworthiness across banks.  In addition, standardized
credit scoring models are now commercially available for credit cards, mortgage lending, and small
business lending (see Altman and Haldeman, 1995; Asch, 1995; Avery et al., 1996), with some (such9
as the Fair, Isaac--or FICO--credit score) actually maintained on the databases of the credit bureaus.
Combining common information sets with common selection criteria can further increase the
correlation of credit analysis and, potentially, of lending decisions across banks.
To the extent that adverse borrower selection is a problem in unconcentrated banking
markets, credit bureaus and standardized credit scoring models can potentially mitigate the severity
of this problem.  Conversely, to the extent that adverse borrower selection is among the various
factors driving the recent and ongoing wave of consolidation among U.S. banks, the further
development of improved and widely accepted credit scoring models might somewhat reduce the
incentive toward additional consolidation.
3
Statistical scoring models have been developed in a manner ensuring that, on a historical
basis, they are more accurate than traditional credit analysis using the same data.  Of course, past
performance is no guarantee of future accuracy.  The most widely available of these models use no
institution-specific data, and all are limited by the degree of accuracy and timeliness of the databases
on which they draw.  Custom scoring models, while capable of using bank-specific data, are often
limited by small samples.  Consequently, controversy has persisted regarding the overall accuracy
of automated credit scoring compared with traditional methods.  
An important point in this regard is that, according to the model above, banks in
unconcentrated markets would suffer a higher loan loss rate using idiosyncratic filters than using an
equally accurate common filter.  Therefore, a common filter may even be somewhat less accurate
than traditional, independently applied financial analysis, and still achieve a lower loan loss rate.
The more banks operate in a market, the more the benefits of a common filter--by circumventing the10
problem of repeated applications by previously rejected applicants--can offset some intrinsic loss of
accuracy in the screening process.  
Thus, the rational stance regarding commercially available credit scoring models versus
traditional methods may vary systematically across banking markets.  A local monopoly bank would
prefer to use the FICO score, for example, only if it is consistently more accurate in identifying
borrower types than the bank’s in-house analysis.  Each bank in a large urban market with dozens
of rival lenders may do better to use the FICO score, by contrast, even if it is not the most accurate
one attainable, simply in order to achieve a uniform outcome across banks.
4
To quantify this effect, let ß  and ß  denote the probabilities of accurately identifying good hH RL
and bad borrowers, respectively, by means of the common filter.  Then, if all banks in the market rely
on the common filter, the mean loan loss rate would be [ß (1 -  ) + (1 - ß )(1 -  )(1 -  )]/[ß hH H RLL h H
+ (1 - ß )(1 -  )].  The minimum (i.e., least accurate) values of ß  and ß  that would equate this loan RL hH RL
loss rate with that given by equation (3) above are given by:
(8) ß /(1 - ß )  =  [1 - (1 - p ) ]/(1 - p ) hH RLh H R L
nn
which is less than p /(1 - p ) since 1 - p  < ½ < p .  Note that this expression is independent of  , hH RLh H R L
, and  .   HL
The magnitude of this effect can be quite striking.  If p  = p  = 0.9 and n = 20, then hH RL
condition (8) is satisfied by ß  = ß  . 0.532.  That is, for only 20 banks in the market, a common hH RL
filter that is only slightly better than random can achieve the same loan loss rate as an i.i.d. filter that
is 90 percent accurate.11
Of course, banks’ choice between an i.i.d. filter and a common filter will depend on expected
profits, which is only indirectly related to the loan loss rate.  The condition for a common filter to
generate the same expected profits as i.i.d. signals is:
(9) ß (r  - 1 +  ) + (1 - ß )(1 -  )(r  - 1 +  )  = hH H H RLL L
[1 - (1 - p ) ] (r  - 1 +  ) + (1 - p )(1 -  )(r  - 1 +  ). hH H H RLL L
nn
Because this expression contains all the parameters in the model, no clear qualitative conclusion
emerges, so it is instructive to consider two numerical examples.  As above, let p  = p  = 0.9 and hH RL
n = 20.  Also let   = 1,   = 0.5,   = 0.8, and r = 0.1.  Then the right-hand side of equation (9) equals HL
0.000942 so that the condition can be satisfied by ß  = ß  . 0.535.  In this case, banks will prefer hH RL
the common filter even if its intrinsic accuracy is substantially worse than that of the i.i.d. filter and
indeed little better than random.  The common filter has a similar effect on expected profits as on
expected loan loss rates for these parameter values. 
By contrast, consider the same parameter values except for   = 0.8 and   = 0.9.  Then the L
right-hand side of equation (9) is about 0.0795 and the condition is satisfied by ß  = ß  . 0.897. hH RL
Thus, with a higher proportion of good borrowers and better performance of bad borrowers, it is
possible for banks to prefer the i.i.d. signals even when the common filter is nearly as accurate,
despite the common filter's ability to reduce expected loan loss rates as shown above.  Together,
these two numerical examples suggest that banks' preference for a common filter will be stronger
in a recession, when defaults are more common, than during the expansion phase of a business cycle.12
The rational outcome may also vary systematically across types of bank loans, depending on
the relevant geographic market for each.  For instance, the geographic market for credit card loans
is essentially nationwide, since there is no need for the lender to be familiar with local economic
conditions or local collateral values.  For such products, unless a bank is able somehow to
differentiate its product from those of its rivals, the effective number of competitors on the lending
side is larger than for more geographically localized products, leading to both a stronger adverse
selection effect and a stronger incentive to adopt common filters.  Our model implies that this may
be one reason why credit card lending has been among the types of bank services for which the
adoption of credit scoring models has been particularly widespread. 
Of course, banks can customize their implementation of the FICO score or equivalent, with
each bank selecting a different acceptance threshold or using different ranges of the score to apply
different collateral, pricing, or guarantee requirements.  In such cases, borrowers may learn that some
banks are more willing than others to lend to riskier applicants, and this learning process might
initially entail several rounds of iterated applications.  Nevertheless, the essential point is that the
signals generated by a common filter are perfectly correlated across banks, even if banks’ responses
to the signals vary systematically.   Given a stable set of policies across banks, one expects that
5
borrowers would eventually begin to self-select in a sequential or hierarchical fashion, with the most
credit worthy borrowers applying at banks setting the highest acceptance threshold, and the least
credit worthy applying to those banks setting the lowest acceptance threshold.  Such a self-selection
equilibrium, which is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze formally, would entail risk-based
pricing of loans such that the most selective banks charge the lowest rate (thereby attracting the most13
creditworthy borrowers) while the least selective banks charge the highest interest rates to cover their
higher loan loss rates.  In this way the self-selection process could be sustained as an equilibrium.
De Novo Banks
In a market with a fixed number of banks, a backlog will accrue over time of applicants who
have been rejected by every bank, subject to the considerations of borrower attrition discussed above.
If a new bank then enters, this backlog of rejected applicants will apply at the new bank along with
the usual mix of first, second, and subsequent applicants common to all banks in the market.  The
fraction of the de novo bank’s total applicant pool reflecting this backlog will depend on the
maximum number of periods following the original rejection that such an applicant is willing to
continue applying.  While that number may be variable, we can at least characterize the mix of types
within this backlog and compare that mix with the proportions of types facing mature banks in the
same market.  It was previously noted in the context of loan loss rates that the pool of applicants
worsens with each successive round of rejection; here we quantify explicitly the mix of applicants
and the change in that mix as a function of the number of rejections.
The mix of applicant types, or ratio of good to bad applicants, within the pool of those who
have been rejected n times is just  (1 - p ) /[(1 -  )p ].  The corresponding ratio for those who have hH RL
nn
been rejected n - 1 times is  (1 - p ) /[(1 -  )p ].  For any n, the ratio of these two ratios is (1 - hH RL
n-1 n-1
p )/p , which is less than 1 since p  > ½ and p  > ½.  Thus, at each successive stage of rejection, hH RLh H R L
the remaining pool of potential borrowers going forward to the next round of applications is
monotonically worse (i.e., has a lower proportion of good applicants versus bad applicants).  For any
value of n, therefore, the backlog facing a new bank entering the market has a worse mix and will14
generate higher loan loss rates than the group of potential borrowers still applying among the
incumbent banks.  As long as the entrant bank uses a similar loan screening technology with
accuracy similar to that of the technology employed by the incumbent banks, the de novo bank will
suffer a higher loan loss rate than the mature incumbents.  This prediction will be tested in the
empirical section below.
Adverse Selection and Fair Lending
An important and long-recognized social issue concerns the possibility that some banks may
condition their credit analysis on observable characteristics that have no direct bearing on the
individual applicant’s ability or willingness to repay, yet have historically correlated with default
rates in excess of what can be predicted based solely on other observable, strictly financial factors.
In response to this problem, U.S. federal law prohibits lenders from conditioning their credit analysis
and lending decisions on certain nonfinancial factors such as race, gender, or age.  The model above
can suggest new implications for the linkage between market structure and the willingness of lenders
to comply with such fair lending laws.
In particular, suppose now that the hypothesized signals represent information contained in
one of the prohibited criteria.  By law, banks must ignore such signals and lend on an equal basis to
all.   The general result here is that, because the screening process (were it permitted to be used) is
6
less effective in less concentrated markets, banks in those markets will have less financial incentive
to oppose or circumvent the fair lending laws than would banks in more concentrated markets.
3.  Empirical Findings15
This section tests some of the theoretical implications discussed above, along with others
developed below.  First, we examine loan chargeoff ratios as a function of the age of the bank in a
fixed-effects linear regression model containing quarterly calendar time dummies as well as annual
age-of-bank dummies.  The sample spans all U.S. commercial banks during 1986-1995, a quarterly
sample containing nearly half a million observations.  Bankers, regulators, and academic researchers
have consistently considered that banks exhibit atypical performance during their first five years, so
we are particularly interested in quantifying this pattern, as well as exploring the extent to which
atypical chargeoff ratios may extend somewhat beyond the five-year horizon.   We included age
7
dummies for each of a bank’s first 10 years, which is longer than the period tracked by most previous
studies of de novo bank performance and longer than observed periods of anomalous profitability;
see DeYoung and Hasan (1997).
Consistent with bankers’ common perception, net chargeoff rates, as shown in Table 1, are
significantly below average during the first year of a bank’s existence and about average during the
second year.  In years 3 through 6, the average chargeoff rate is roughly double that of mature banks.
In years 7 through 9, the chargeoff rate is still about 40 - 50 percent higher than that of mature banks,
with the difference statistically significant.  Only in a bank’s tenth year does the chargeoff experience
approach that of more mature banks.  These findings not only confirm bankers’ perceptions and
support the theory, but they also show that transitional effects of bank entry persist nearly twice as
long as regulators and academic researchers have believed.
We must consider whether our findings reflect actual adverse selection of loan applicants,
or merely a learning process involving inexperienced lenders.  De novo banks always begin
operation with experienced staff and management in selected key positions, as this is a regulatory16
prerequisite to obtaining a bank charter.  Thus, it is unlikely that the findings reflect merely a
learning process.  However, even if the predictions of the adverse selection model are "right for the
wrong reason," the empirical results remain instructive in their own right.
As a test of robustness, and to explore systematic differences in recovery rates, the same
regression was run for gross chargeoff rates.  Table 2 shows that banks experience significantly
lower gross chargeoff rates than mature banks during their first two years and significantly higher
gross chargeoff rates in years 3 through 9, a pattern of age dependency similar to that reported in
Table 1.  Comparing the right-hand columns of Tables 1 and 2, we see that the magnitude of the
excess is smaller for gross chargeoff rates than for net chargeoff rates during these latter years,
implying that recovery rates as a fraction of gross chargeoffs are lower for de novo banks than for
mature banks on average.  
These results are consistent with, and complementary to, results on the profit efficiency of
de novo banks reported by DeYoung and Hasan (1997).  That study found that new banks are
significantly less profitable than older banks of the same asset size until the ninth year of a bank’s
operation.  However, the pattern of loan delinquencies observed in that study did not appear to be
a contributing factor to the lower profitability, and loan chargeoffs were not explored.  DeYoung and
Hasan included age-of-bank dummies for the first 14 years of a bank’s charter, unlike previous
studies of post-deregulation de novos, which quantified the impact of only the first eight years.  
A second empirical approach focuses on mature banks, each operating in a single geographic
market (MSA).  Using a cross-sectional sample of nearly 3,000 banks in over 300 MSAs across the
U.S. as of year-end 1990, we find that loan chargeoff rates are a significantly increasing function of
the total number of banks in the MSA, consistent with the theory (Table 3).   This relationship
817
persists across total loans even when the population of the MSA (not shown) and other
characteristics are controlled for.  The estimated magnitude of the effect implies that each additional
rival bank drives up the gross chargeoff rate of each incumbent by 0.10 basis points, or 0.10 percent
of the sample mean chargeoff rate.  Since the number of incumbent banks ranges from 4 to 311
across the sample MSAs, the aggregate impact on loan chargeoffs is economically significant.
Table 3 also shows that the log of the number of banks is even more significant and yields
a higher adjusted R-square than the simple number of banks, implying a nonlinear relationship
between bank structure and performance consistent with the theoretical considerations spelled out
in the previous section.  The net chargeoff ratio increases by 2.7 basis points as the number of banks
in an MSA increases from five to six, or by 1.6 basis points as the number of banks increases from
nine to 10, for example.  Thus, for MSAs containing a small number of banks, structure has a greater
magnitude of effect on chargeoffs in the semilog model than in the linear model.
Again, it is possible that the empirical linkage between bank structure and ex post credit
quality may be driven by other factors besides adverse borrower selection.  While the available data
cannot distinguish among alternative explanations, the empirical finding has apparently not been
previously recognized and merits closer scrutiny.  
However, the effect is not uniform across all types of loans.  When chargeoffs are
disaggregated by loan type, as shown in the last six columns of Table 3, bank structure exhibits a
significant effect on commercial loans but an insignificant effect on consumer loans and "other"
loans (including real estate and agricultural loans).  Possible reasons for these differences might
include the role of collateral in real estate and agricultural loans, common data (for example, from
credit bureaus) used for consumer loans, standardized lending criteria across certain categories of18
real estate loans, and other factors.  In addition, the geographic market for some loan types, such as
credit card loans, may not be well approximated by a single MSA, rendering our structural measures
inappropriate in those cases.  Data for savings and loan associations were unavailable, and although
the number of S&Ls should be positively correlated with the number of banks in an MSA, it is
possible that the exclusion of S&Ls may have weakened the results for those types of loans (such
as consumer or residential real estate loans) in which S&Ls compete most strongly with commercial
banks.  The net chargeoff ratio for commercial loans exhibited a nonlinear response to bank
structure, as suggested by theory, since the log of the number of banks was more significant than the
simple number of banks.
9
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A further important question concerns the welfare effects of this apparent adverse selection.
Since banks are only imperfectly able to distinguish ex ante between good credits and bad credits,
perfect risk-based pricing is not possible (and would carry its own adverse selection effects as
analyzed by Broecker, 1990, besides being subject to the intrinsic limitations analyzed by Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981).  Thus, within a market, good borrowers must somewhat subsidize bad borrowers.
The ambiguous effect of the adverse selection on banks’ expected profits, shown theoretically above,
indicates that the overall welfare effects are not obvious but must be analyzed explicitly. 
The broader effect of adverse borrower selection on the economy hinges on whether the
primary distinction between creditworthy and uncreditworthy borrowers involves the mean or the
dispersion of the distribution of returns on their respective projects.  The nature of the loan contract
limits the extent to which banks can share in the upper tail of volatile returns; thus, if bad credit risks19
face projects that are more volatile than those of good credit risks but have comparable mean returns,
then funding those projects could be beneficial to society on balance, even though it may represent
a redistribution of expected profits from the banking sector to the real sector.  The recently
recognized importance of the financial intermediation sector in fostering economic growth (see, for
example, Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Krol and Svorny, 1996) underscores the relevance of this
question. 
Regressions addressing this issue are summarized in Table 5 using data characterized in
Table 4.  The dependent variable is the percentage change in money income per household between
1979 and 1989 by MSA for a nationwide sample, analogous to the statewide economic growth
variables explored in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Krol and Svorny (1996).  Explanatory
variables include the MSA population as of 1980, the percentage of adults in each MSA with four
or more years of college education, and the number of banks with one or more offices in each MSA
during the years 1979 or 1984.  In the linear equations (odd-numbered models), the point estimates
correspond to an incremental 10-year income growth of 10 to 13 basis points per additional bank in
the MSA.  When population is included in the regression, its collinearity with the number of banks
(rho = 0.89 for both 1979 and 1984) inflates the standard error of the coefficient on the latter
variable.  Of the two variables, the number of banks exhibits the more significant association with
growth when both are included.  
The even-numbered models in Table 5 incorporate the natural logarithm of the number of
banks operating in each MSA.  This form is intended to capture the anticipated effect of "applicant
attrition" as discussed above, assuming that the linkage between structure and growth reflects to
some extent the adverse selection of applicants.  Comparing these results with those of the odd-20
numbered models, we see that the log variables all exhibit larger t-ratios and yield higher adjusted
R-squares than the corresponding linear models.  This outcome may reflect the mitigation of
multicollinearity, since the correlation between the log of the number of banks and population is only
0.67 for both 1979 and 1984.  However, these results also support a nonlinear linkage between bank
structure and community income growth.  The estimated coefficients indicate that an additional bank
is associated with an increase of 62 to 72 basis points in the MSA’s 10-year growth rate for an MSA
with five banks initially, 36 to 41 basis points for an MSA with nine banks, and 14 to 16 basis points
for an MSA with 24 banks, for example.  
Because of multicollinearity between the number of banks and population, we considered it
important to explore the robustness of the estimates by estimating several variants of the model.
Some of these variants used subsets of MSAs with populations between 100,000 and 1 million, or
between 100,000 and 500,000, as a way of reducing the severity of the multicollinearity.  In all cases,
the number of banks operating in each MSA in 1979 was positively and significantly associated with
the subsequent economic growth rate of that MSA; the magnitude and significance of the
corresponding coefficient was greater for the subsamples (not shown in the table) than for the full
sample.  Similarly, the coefficient on the number of banks in 1984 was significantly positive in
nearly all cases.  
As further tests of robustness, the models were estimated with additional control variables
(not shown in the table) including banks per capita, public expenditures per capita, and the
percentage of Democratic votes in the 1992 presidential election (the last two variables suggested
by Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996).  These variables were not statistically significant and did not
materially alter the magnitude or significance of the estimated coefficients on the other variables.21
In general, it appears to be a robust finding that a larger number of banks within an MSA is
associated with a significantly higher concurrent or subsequent growth rate in per capita income.
In the linear models, the stronger association seems to be with subsequent growth rather than
contemporaneous growth: the bank numbers for 1979 generated larger adjusted R-squares, generally
larger point estimates, and generally larger t-statistics than the bank numbers for 1984 in
corresponding models (comparing models 1 and 5, and 3 and 7 in Table 5).  In the semilog models,
the regressions incorporating 1979 bank structure data exhibited slightly larger adjusted R-squares,
although 1984 bank structure figures yielded larger point estimates and t-ratios (comparing models
2 and 6, and 4 and 8).  
The available data cannot establish whether a primary mechanism linking growth to bank
structure is truly the credit underwriting practices of banks in conjunction with patterns of loan
applications, as reflected in Table 3.  Other factors could be at work, and the proximate effect of the
lending patterns associated with higher chargeoff rates could be either positive or negative.  For
example, if lending occurs at more competitive interest rates in less concentrated markets, then
overall investment and growth might be relatively stimulated in such markets.  Greater competition
might also be associated with more aggressive credit underwriting standards and hence higher
chargeoff rates.  However, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find at a statewide level that higher
economic growth rates are associated with lower chargeoff rates.  At any rate, Tables 3 and 5
together indicate at a minimum that the higher chargeoff rates associated with less concentrated
market structures at the MSA level do not undermine local economic growth on balance, even if they
constitute a net transfer of wealth from the banking sector to the real sector.  Further study of this
important question is warranted.  22
4.  Conclusion
This paper has explored linkages among bank structure, loan performance, and local
economic growth.  Building on theoretical models of Broecker (1990) and Nakamura (1993), it has
identified additional dimensions of the adverse borrower selection effects that the banking industry
would be expected to exhibit as a function of structure and has provided the first empirical tests of
such effects.  The results indicate that newly chartered banks experience substantially higher loan
chargeoff rates during their third through ninth years, consistent with the theory.  Among mature
banks, those operating in less concentrated banking markets experience significantly higher
chargeoff rates for commercial loans and for total loans, again as predicted theoretically.  
However, these higher chargeoff rates are not enough to undermine local economic growth.
On the contrary, household money income was found to grow significantly faster in MSAs
containing more banks, compared with MSAs containing fewer banks.  Available data did not permit
a precise explanation of this effect, but we cannot rule out the possibility that additional lending by
banks in unconcentrated markets was a causal factor in spite of the higher average chargeoff rate.
The theoretically ambiguous linkage between chargeoffs and bank profits is consistent with this
interpretation.
The evidence presented here suggests at least two additional, but somewhat opposing, roles
of antitrust policies in the banking industry.  First, to the extent that higher chargeoff rates undermine
banks’ safety and soundness, structural policies that encourage lower chargeoff rates could benefit
the banking industry.  Such policies might include more stringent standards for chartering new
banks, given the severity and duration of their loan quality problems documented above and their
correspondingly reduced profitability as found by DeYoung and Hasan (1997).  At the same time,23
however, local economic growth is found to benefit from an unconcentrated local banking structure
and could, by implication, benefit from policies that discourage local structural consolidation.  Given
that many of the 3,000 new U.S. banks in recent years have formed because of displaced bankers and
dissatisfied customers in the wake of bank mergers, it is likely that the second policy could actually
complement the first.  24
Table 1: Net Chargeoff Ratio vs. Bank Age 
(Quarterly Data, 1986-1995)
Variable Coefficient t-ratio % Increment in Chargeoff Rate
vs. All Banks
Constant 0.00221 7.44*    --
Year 1 -0.00126 -2.68* -60.38%
Year 2 -0.00041 -0.94 -19.57%
Year 3 0.00202 4.93* 96.89%
Year 4 0.00169 4.30* 80.96%
Year 5 0.00177 4.48* 84.78%
Year 6 0.00214 5.28* 102.15%
Year 7 0.00117 2.81* 55.84%
Year 8 0.00076 1.77** 36.60%
Year 9 0.00083 1.84** 39.90%
Year 10 0.00059 1.25 28.13%
Loans 1.570E-10 2.85*    --
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.10 level.  Calendar time dummies not reported
for brevity.  Adjusted R-square = 0.0016.  Number of observations = 475,027.  Observations
reporting negative gross chargeoffs (2494) were deleted.25
Table 2: Gross Chargeoff Ratio vs. Bank Age 
(Quarterly Data, 1986-1995)
Variable Coefficient t-ratio % Increment in Chargeoff Rate
vs. All Banks
Constant 0.00286 9.51*    --
Year 1 -0.00175 -3.67* -64.09%
Year 2 -0.00089 -2.01** -32.54%
Year 3 0.00178 4.28* 65.34%
Year 4 0.00151 3.78* 55.20%
Year 5 0.00166 4.14* 60.87%
Year 6 0.00224 5.45* 81.99%
Year 7 0.00118 2.80* 43.19%
Year 8 0.00075 1.70*** 27.31%
Year 9 0.00085 1.84*** 31.11%
Year 10 0.00062 1.31 22.77%
Loans 1.579E-10 2.82*    --
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level. ***significant at the 0.10 level.
Calendar time dummies not reported for brevity.  Adjusted R-square = 0.0017.  Number of
observations = 475,027.  Observations reporting negative gross chargeoffs (2494) were deleted.26
Table 3: Mature Banks’ Gross Chargeoff Rates and Market Structure (1990)
(t-statistics in Parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Net Chargeoff Ratio for:
Loan Type: Total            Commercial     Consumer      Other           
Explanatory
Variable:
Constant 0.0038 -.0008 0.0032 -0.0024 0.173 0.102 -1.50 -1.42
(1.14) (-0.26) (0.49) (-0.38) (0.75) (0.70) (-0.66) (-0.65)
Number of banks 1.01E-5    -- 1.20E-5    -- 1.12E-5   -- -8.20E-4   --
in same MSA (2.89)* (1.73)** (0.05) (-0.35)
log (# banks) -- 0.00149     -- 0.00173    -- 0.00936    -- 0.0303
(5.72)* (3.20)* (0.75) (0.16)
% high school grad. 0.0154 0.0149 0.0280 0.0257 -0.153 -0.098 -0.535 -0.413
in MSA adult pop. (3.40)* (3.69)* (3.14)* (3.10)* (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.18) (-0.14)
# bank employees / 3.256 1.819 7.308 5.144 -114.53 -70.65 1248.2 1214.8
$ total bank assets (3.28)* (2.05)** (3.72)* (2.82)* (-1.25) (-1.22) (1.80) (1.81)
aa
MSA employment / -2.0E-7  -2.3E-7  -3.6E-7  -3.7E-7 1.2E-6 9.4E-8 3.4E-5 2.6E-5
MSA population (-4.59)* (-5.75)*    (-4.06)* (-4.40)* (0.40) (0.05) (1.15) (0.88)
Adjusted R-square 0.0117 0.0178 0.0111 0.0106 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001
Number of obs. 2864 2864 2835 2835 2814 2814 2848 2848
*significant at the 0.01 level. **significant at the 0.05 level.  significant at the 0.10 level.
a
Sample = all banks more than five years old with assets between $3 million and $3 billion operating within a single
MSA in 1990.  The varying sample size across columns reflects the fact that not all banks reported chargeoffs in
every loan category.  Results for total loans are robust with respect to inclusion or omission of total MSA
population, which exhibits a coefficient not significantly different from zero when included (not shown).27
Table 4: Summary Statistics on MSA Growth Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
10-year growth (%) 2.57 11.49 -30.6 31.2
# banks in 1979 17.10 20.79 1 153
# banks in 1984 16.68 19.34 1 175
MSA population 
in 1980 (000) 593.36 1016.76 63.00 8275.00
% of MSA’s adults
who completed college 19.76 6.28 9.50 44.0028
Table 5: Effect of Bank Structure on Local Economic Growth
Dependent variable: Percentage growth in money income per household by MSA, 1979-89.
(Heteroskedastic-consistent t-statistics in parentheses)
                                                   Model                                            
    1      2       3       4       5       6    7    8
Variable
Intercept -13.16 -18.63 -13.19 -19.28 -12.06 -18.40 -12.14 -18.60
(-5.70)* (-7.19)* (-5.75)* (-7.82)* (-5.75)* (-7.41)* (-5.85)* (-8.06)*
#bks79   0.126 -- 0.135 --     -- -- -- --
(1.71)** (3.45)*
log(#bks79) -- 3.411 -- 3.770 -- -- -- --
(4.12)* (5.68)*
#bks84     -- -- -- -- 0.106 -- 0.129 --
(1.29) (2.66)*
log(#bks84) -- -- -- -- -- 3.816 -- 3.925
(4.34)* (5.72)*
Population 0.00018 0.00046 -- -- 0.00049 0.00015 -- --
(0.14) (0.57) (0.40) (0.18)
%College 0.664 0.625 0.665 0.631 0.636 0.592 0.636 0.593
(5.82)* (5.76)* (5.38)* (5.84)* (6.11)* (6.02)* (6.12)* (6.04)*
Number of
observations 237 237 237 237 286 286 286 286
Adjusted 
R-square 0.219 0.250 0.223 0.252 0.197 0.240 0.200 0.243
*significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.10 level.  29
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1.  As in Ferguson and Peters (1995), this calculation incorporates the simplifying but innocuous
assumptions that the cost of funds and other resource costs have been normalized to zero and that
there is no partial recovery of defaulted loans.
2.  Of course, this result depends in part on the maintained assumption of a fixed interest rate,
whereas in practice it is possible that the degree of price competition in loans might increase with
the number of banks in the market.  However, several empirical studies such as Nathan and
Neave (1989), Shaffer (1993a), and Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994) have found evidence of
essentially competitive conduct in structurally concentrated banking markets.
3.  Some other, generally dominant, motives for consolidation include cost reduction and
diversification.  Adverse borrower selection would not typically motivate cross-market
consolidation.
4.  Of course, other factors such as lower cost may also motivate the use of credit scoring models.
5.  Note also that a common filter is not the same as mere knowledge that an applicant has been
previously rejected by another lender, as in Nakamura’s "hierarchical lenders" scenario.  The
latter case is consistent with i.i.d. signals for each lender, with each bank putting more weight on
its own signal than on the information implied by a prior rejection.
6.  Here we may relax the assumption that r  - 1 +   < 0 and merely assume that r  +   < r  + LL L L H
.  Note that, as documented in Shaffer (1996), a uniform interest rate r must be charged to both H
types of borrowers according to current U.S. federal policy under this interpretation of the model. 
Note also that, although the structure of our model resembles that of Ferguson and Peters (1995)
and Shaffer (1996), the interpretation of our signals as applied to fair lending in this section is
different.
7.  A number of cost studies of depository institutions have excluded from the sample any
institution that is less than five years old or so, on the grounds that the balance sheets and income
statements of newer banks may be atypical (see for example Mester, 1993; Shaffer, 1993b;
Hughes et al., 1996).
8.  The year is chosen to permit contemporaneous census data to be used as control variables.
9.  The adjusted R-square is lower in the logarithmic equation because each of the three
demographic variables exhibits less significance than in the purely linear equation.
Footnotes